Terrorism: Sober, yet Realistic

By Elempe Dele

Terrorism in Nigeria is a complex, multi-dimensional problem. It is adaptive, profit-driven, and deeply rooted in governance gaps, demography, poverty, and regional contagion from the unstable Sahel. It has never been a simple case of “leadership failure” since Boko Haram’s insurgency began in 2009.

It is unfortunate how easily people fall into the hands of terrorists and opposition actors who recycle the same emotional script every election cycle. When terrorists generate fear, we demand strongmen. We protest for instant solutions. Politicians promise what security realities cannot deliver. Some even ask why drones cannot peer into bedrooms and forests.

When you see people turning a security crisis into political leverage, content, or fear-mongering, you should spot the pattern from afar.

In 2014, the abduction of the Chibok girls became potent political fuel. That national grief and the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign helped sweep President Goodluck Jonathan out of power. The message was simple and fiery: remove an “incompetent” president and bring in a ruthless disciplinarian — a former military general who would crush the wildfire of terrorism. There were genuine issues of poor communication, low military morale, and corruption in the defence sector at the time.

Yet, in 2018, the Dapchi girls abduction occurred under that same former General, President Muhammadu Buhari. This highlighted the continuity of vulnerability. While Buhari’s administration recorded important territorial gains against Boko Haram early on, new inflows of fighters and arms across porous borders continued. Killer herdsmen violence was sometimes tolerated or inadequately addressed, adding another layer to the insecurity.

Terror attacks did not abate. States in the Southeast (Anambra, Imo, Abia, Enugu) faced homegrown threats from IPOB and ESN, while even Katsina — Buhari’s home state — became saturated with banditry to the point where his own safety was reportedly at risk.

The material drivers are clear: as long as banditry, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and illegal mining remain highly profitable, these activities will persist even if security forces kill fighters daily. Many perpetrators are not hardcore ideologues open to dialogue — they are economic opportunists who can earn tens of millions of naira from a single ransom. They do not respect their own lives. Leaders and foot soldiers have been eliminated repeatedly, yet the problem regenerates like a hydra because the enabling conditions remain.

I am not advocating defeat. I am both an optimist and a realist. Just as societies have had to accept certain social strains as enduring features, we must accept that terrorism — like in much of the West African Sahel — is now part of our reality. We will not eradicate it with magic, but we can contain, degrade, and manage it daily while recording incremental successes.

Grief and fear are powerful mobilizers. Opposition actors and critics have every incentive to amplify failures while downplaying gains — this political script works emotionally on a disenchanted populace. I do not subscribe to conspiracy narratives about opposition complicity in the violence itself, but the selective focus is obvious.

Anyone promising to “wipe out terrorism in four years” or offering simplistic negotiations is engaging in mind-theft. Such claims ignore the real complexities: intelligence gathering, community policing, deradicalization, poverty alleviation, climate pressures on pastoralism, madrasas producing vulnerable youth, and economic incentives.

Roughly 400,000 police officers cannot effectively secure a population of over 200 million, many living in vast ungoverned spaces. The military is better equipped today with increased budgeting and international collaboration, yet it remains stretched across multiple fronts — terrorists, bandits, secessionists, and herder violence. Forests like Sambisa and border terrains with unstable Sahel states compound the challenge.

Why do critics rarely discuss the successes of our security forces? Large-scale operations have destroyed camps, rescued victims, neutralized commanders, and restored some farmlands and villages. Improved airpower, better tactics, and regional cooperation have degraded strongholds in Sambisa and the Lake Chad region. These incremental wins are splashed across social media yet receive little viral attention. We seem glued to pessimism.

We must refuse both delusional grief and denial. The mature path is to embrace reality rather than surrender to it. The menace is here. We will fight it relentlessly, build resilience, and reduce its profitability and space. Counter-insurgency is historically slow, expensive, ugly, and full of trade-offs — as seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali. Performative rhetoric and quick-fix promises ignore these hard lessons.
The truth is bitter on the surface. But take a deeper bite, and you taste clarity.